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The Right to Self-Defense in the Post-Cold
War Era: The Role of the United Nations
DAVID R. PENNA*
The emergent era of superpower cooperation promises much for in-
ternational law. The institutional and legal frameworks set in place after
the close of the Second World War were premised upon an assumption of
superpower cooperation. When that cooperation was absent, it was cer-
tain that international law would play a minimal role in constraining su-
perpower conflict; since superpowers perceived that their interests were
broad in an era of competition, it was rare for both superpowers to at-
tempt to simultaneously utilize the U.N. framework to resolve "security"
issues.' With the coming of superpower cooperation and the ability of the
U.N. to act in the Iraq-Kuwait crisis, there is a certain optimism that
things have changed.2 This article explores the grounds for (and the lim-
its of) that optimism in the context of the most important international
legal principle in the security area: the right to self-defense.
Since claims of self-defense have been used to justify almost every
recent use of force,3 one can claim that the exception at times seems to
swallow the general rule against the use of force. Therefore, any attempt
to regulate the use of force in the post-Cold War era must first come to
terms with defining this exception and evolving a means to enforce this
definition in specific circumstances. The prospects for the evolution and
institutionalization of this ideal is the main focus of this article. First, the
status of the self-defense exception to the prohibition of the use of armed
force is briefly reviewed up to the end of the Cold War period. Next, al-
ternative systems of self-defense are presented and discussed, specifying
the normative and institutional requirements for each system. Then, the
major event of the post-Cold War era thus far, the Kuwait conflict, is
analyzed. In the final section of this article, the implications of the func-
tioning of a new post-Cold War system of self-defense are explored.
* Director of Publications, Center on Rights Development; B.A./M.A., 1982, Duquesne
University; J.D., 1985, University of Denver, College of Law; Ph.D. Candidate, University of
Denver Graduate School of International Studies.
1. A discussion of the failed Charter institutions with respect to security issues is given
in Anthony C. Arend, International Law and the Recourse to Force: A Shift in Paradigms
27 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 6-10 (1990).
2. This optimism has been endangered by attempts to remove President Gorbachev
and roll back his reforms in the Soviet Union.
3. Claims of self defense were made by Iraq in Kuwait, the Soviet Union in Afghani-
stan, the U.S. in Panama and Nicaragua, Vietnam in Cambodia, and Tanzania in Uganda,
to list just a few recent examples.
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I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DEFENSE
Today self-defense is the major exception to the prohibition on the
use of force by states;4 however, at one time such a general prohibition
did not exist. War was an acceptable legal relationship between states as
long as it was properly declared and waged and was for a "just" cause.
Self-defense was only one of several just causes for war or the use of
force.'
As war came to be seen as destructive, attempts were made to abolish
or limit recourse to war as a means of settling disputes. The Covenant of
the League of Nations contained mutual assurances regarding recourse to
war: war could not be resorted to if the dispute was under consideration
by the League, an arbiter or a court;6 nor could there be recourse to war if
a state complied with the judgment of one of these bodies.7 In any case,
there could be no recourse to war until at least three months after any of
these bodies rendered a decision.' The exception, of course, was self-
defense.
Self-defense also remained an important implied exception to the
Pact of Paris, which sought to abolish war as an instrument of national
policy. While the treaty makes no explicit reference to self-defense, the
parties understood that such a right was preserved. The issue was not
covered in the Pact due to the insistence of the United States, which
claimed that to define a right of self-defense would lead to the abuse of
this right by states who would seek to mold their actions to fit the lan-
guage of the exception. s
The U.N. Charter, much as the League of Nations Covenant, seeks to
limit the recourse to war. It does so through article 2(4), which prohibits
the use of force against the political independence or territorial integrity
of states.10 This principle is to be enforced by the Security Council which
has the power to act to maintain or restore international peace and secur-
ity through the implementation of a range of collective measures up to
4. Arend, supra note 1, at 29.
5. During the time of Hugo Grotius (the 17th century), a war was regarded as just if it
was in response to a "wrong received." Grotius, quoted in AHMED M. RIFAAT, INTERNATIONAL
AGGRESSION 12 (1979).
6. League of Nations Covenant, June 28, 1919, art. 12, 1, T.S. No. 4.
7. Id. art. 13, 4.
8. Id. art. 12, 1 1.
9. See Kellog, Note to French Ambassador, infra, at 37.
10. Arend claims there were only two exceptions to the use of force prohibition in Arti-
cle 2(4) under the "Charter paradigm": the Security Council power to restore international
peace and security, and self defense under article 51, Arend, supra note 1, at 1-2. Others
would contend that there may exist another basis for the use of force: humanitarian inter-
vention. See generally, FERNANDO R. TES6N, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO
LAW AND MORALITY (1988); HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS (Rich-
ard B. Lillich ed. 1973); Ved P. Nanda, Multilateral Sanctions Against South Africa, in
EFFECTIVE SANCTIONS ON SOUTH AFRICA: THE CUTrING EDGE OF ECONOMIC INTERVENTION 15-
16, (George W. Shepherd, ed. 1991).
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and including the use of force.
This, at least, was how the structure of the U.N. was intended to
work, although, in fact, difficulties arose due to the inability of the per-
manent members to agree in most situations. Some would contend that
the current rapprochement between the superpowers will act to revitalize
this system;" it is also possible, however, that it is too late to resurrect
the system as originally intended. It may also be that the post-Cold War
changes in international politics will enable the U.N. system to be utilized
in ways the Charter framers had not intended.
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter preserves the "inherent" right of indi-
vidual and collective self-defense. That is, in a document that otherwise
limits the use of force, the Charter claims not to affect the right of self-
defense, supposedly preserving it as it existed under customary interna-
tional law. 2 However, the provision does limit the duration to act under
this right to periods prior to the Security Council action to restore inter-
national peace and security."
II. SYSTEMS OF SELF-DEFENSE
The interplay of the norms discussed above and the means of their
enforcement create a system. The same norms interpreted and enforced
through differing institutions are likely to create differing patterns of
behavior.
At this point, it may be useful to conceptualize four possible systems
of protection against aggression.1' The first is a system of each state for
itself: if a state is attacked, it is entitled to defend itself by using force.
This can be labelled a system of individual defense."5 It has a major
weakness: the stronger states can attack the weaker without much risk,
since the weak states are unlikely to be capable of inflicting much damage
on stronger states when acting individually. Therefore, each state must
maintain adequate military means "for the dangers it anticipates."1
A second system is one in which an attacked state has the right to
call upon other states to assist it in repelling an attack. Other states may
11. Thomas M. Franck, Comment, Soviet Initiatives: U.S. Responses - New Opportu-
nities for Reviving the United Nations System, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 531 (1989); John Quigley,
Comment, Perestroika and International Law, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 788, 794-97 (1988).
12. See Oscar Schachter, Self-Defense and the Rule of Law, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 259,
259-63 (1989).
13. See Mary E. O'Connell, Enforcing the Prohibition on the Use of Force: The U.N.'s
Response To Iraq's Invasion Of Kuwait, 15 S. ILL. U. L.J. 453, 476-79 (1991).
14. I do not mean to suggest that all of these systems existed at actual periods of his-
tory; even those that did exist did not ever control all aspects of self defense in all regions.
These are just theoretic possibilities, and ideal types at that.
15. While the system described is clearly a system of individual defense, Stromberg
notes that collective security has been used in several contexts, ROLAND N. STROMBERG, COL-
LECTIVE SECURITY AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 191-92 (1963).
16. W. Michael Reisman, Comment, Some Lessons From Iraq: International Law and
Democratic Politics, 16 YALE J. INT'L L. 203 (1991).
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or may not respond, according to individual treaty commitments or politi-
cal considerations. The weakness of this system is that weaker states re-
main vulnerable since they may be unable to gain guarantees from allies.
A state is not totally reliant upon its own military capability, hence the
weaker the military capability, the stronger the diplomatic capability
must be to gain allies.
A third system is slightly different: it would require all other states
to respond to aggression. In this system, the aggression is viewed as a
violation of the rights of each state in the community rather than the
rights of merely the victim state. The weakness here is that some impor-
tant states may prefer to ignore violations of community norms if they do
not believe that their interests are sufficiently imperilled.
A fourth system is further institutionalized. It envisions an indepen-
dent actor as enforcer of the community norms. Individual actors would
have only very limited recourse to force, since this institutional actor, a
world government, would be viewed as having a near monopoly on the
legitimate use of force. This institution would have a duty to respond to
violations of community norms, but would not necessarily have to react
through the use of identical force;' 7 it would merely have to preserve the
community norms.
While the differences between these systems may seem slight, they
do have some important implications. While realizing the limits of anal-
ogy, it will be instructive to illustrate some of the differences by reference
to the domestic legal system.
The international right to self-defense is often analogized to the do-
mestic right of individuals to use force in self-defense."8 Take, for in-
stance, the example of an individual encountering a criminal who is a
threat to the life of the innocent individual." The first system is illus-
trated by the somewhat outmoded concept of the "fair fight." While force
is ordinarily not permissible in interpersonal relations, it may be em-
ployed if an individual is himself threatened with violence.20 Others, how-
ever, may not use violence, even against the aggressor since this would
result in an "unfair" fight and threaten the escalation of violence.2 1
17. An analogy can be made here to the domestic system where a murderer need not be
killed, nor even be met with force, if lesser measures can be successful.
18. See e.g., Hans Kelsen, Collective Security, in 49 U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE INTER-
NATIONAL LAW STUDIES 1 (1954).
19. In a domestic context, Robinson notes that an individual who is the victim of ag-
gression may justifiably cause a "greater harm" in order to protect himself. He cites the case
of a victim killing three thugs in order to save his own life. This is justified because "society
highly values the protection of innocents and deplores unjustified aggression." PAUL H.
ROBINSON, 1 CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 131a, at 70 (1984).
20. FREDRIC S. BAUM & JOAN BAUM, LAW OF SELF DEFENSE 6 (1970). Baum and Baum
note that Blackstone distinguished between justifiable homicide and excusable homicide,
with the former still carrying some degree of guilt. Self-defense was excusable homicide
rather than justifiable homicide and therefore had a degree of culpability.
21. This aspect has no analogy in modern law, which does allow for limited defensive
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The second system permits the wronged party to call for help, but
does not obligate others to give it.22 It still recognizes the wrong commit-
ted as essentially a private wrong and allows redress only through self-
enforcement.2"
The third system is quite different: it requires a response not only to
provide protection to weaker individuals, but also because the initial use
of force can be viewed as a wrong against each individual in the commu-
nity. The individuals act together to vindicate this wrong, but do not
delegate the responsibility to some institutional actor, which is seen as
either unresponsive or incapable of achieving the vindication of the
norms infringed.2 4 In the fourth system, any use of force is viewed as pri-
marily against the community and, in particular, against the institutional
actor or government of the community.2 5 In human systems, some vestige
of rights of self-defense would remain since the destruction of an individ-
ual life cannot be reconstituted after the fact. In a state system, however,
this is not the case. Either states are kept legally intact after their terri-
tory has been over-run, or the state can be reconstituted after the aggres-
sion has been repelled by the institutional actor's forces. Therefore, in
such a state-system, if a reliable institutional actor is created, it could be
contended that a right of self-defense would not only be unnecessary but
counterproductive .26
While identifying actual manifestations of each of these ideal systems
is difficult and likely to be imperfect, some possible historical examples
may better illustrate the workings of these systems. The first system is
illustrated in the policies of United States isolationism. For example, neu-
trality acts, 27 which prohibited the provision of assistance to either side in
an armed conflict were based upon several perceptions. First, the conflict
intervention for the protection of others; it may be illustrated, however, by rules in sport
which punish severely intervention by third persons in a brawl that has already been
started. It is common for players to be fined and suspended for being the "third man in," or
"first man off the bench" in sport. The rationale is that it is an attempt to limit violence so
that officials can control the initial outbreak. The analogy is imperfect, however, since sport
presupposes the presence of officials who will act to limit the outbreak of violence.
22. In domestic law there exists no duty to give aid to another. There are limitations on
the use of force to assist another. See ROBINSON, supra note 19, § 133.
23. This is analogous to Norman law in early England where "homicide was considered
a matter of private vengeance." BAUM & BAUM, supra note 20, at 3. It is also analogous to
some conceptions of traditional African law; see, JOHN CAMPBELL, 2 TRAVELS IN SOUTH AF-
RICA 210-11 (1822).
24. In some respects, this is the same reasoning that underlies the justification of vigi-
lante action. See CAMPBELL, supra note 23, at 49-52.
25. Some would argue that the international system ultimately protects the lives of in-
dividuals, Kelsen, supra note 18, at 1, but one must be careful not to assume an identity of
individual and state interests.
26. Kelsen, supra note 18, at 27.
27. Neutrality acts generally only banned assistance that did not have executive ap-
proval. See FRANCIS DEAK & PHILLIP C. JESSUP, 2 A COLLECTION OF NEUTRALITY LAWS, REG-
ULATIONS AND TREATIES OF VARIOUS COUNTRIES 1079-1115 (1974) (a collection of U.S. neu-
trality acts).
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did not involve United States interests, and therefore, the United States
should not become involved. Second, the participation of United States
citizens could endanger United States relations with the warring states. A
less substantial concern was to limit the conflict to the original combat-
ants and not engulf the region in war.
The second system is illustrated in the French draft of the Pact of
Paris" and implicitly in the final draft of that pact. There, states re-
nounced the use of force as an instrument of national policy. 9 However,
if a state breached its promise by employing force, all other parties were
to be released from their obligation toward the breaching party.30 While
states were not obligated to come to the defense of the victim state, many
states were obligated to do so by bilateral treaties.-"
The third system is illustrated by the European system in the Cold
War era. While the U.N. Charter permissively authorized collective self-
defense in Article 51, other agreements assured the use of force in retalia-
tion to an armed attack.3" The examples here include the NATO" and
Warsaw Pact treaties.34 Formerly, the League of Nations Covenant at-
tempted a similar, but more limited obligation, declaring, "Should-any
Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants... it
shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all
other Members of the League. ... "" The members were to "immedi-
28. French Draft Of Treaty For The Condemnation And Renunciation Of War As An
Instrument Of National Policy, translated in 133 FOREIGN REL. LAW OF THE U.S. 32-34
(1928, vol. 1) [hereinafter French Draft].
29. Id. at art. I. The renunciation was "without intention to infringe upon the exercise
of their rights of legitimate self-defense within the framework of existing treaties ..
30. Id. at art. III.
31. While the final draft of the pact, Treaty Between the United States and Other Pow-
ers, August 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, reprinted in 133 FOREIGN REL. LAW OF THE U.S. 153-56
(1928), contained no explicit recognition of the right to self defense, the Kellog criticism of
the earlier French draft claimed "[tihere is nothing in the American draft ... which re-
stricts or impairs in any way the right of self defense. That right is inherent in every sover-
eign and implicit in every treaty." Kellog, Telegram from the Secretary of State to the Am-
bassador in France (April 23, 1928), reprinted in 133 FOREIGN RL. LAW OF THE U.S. 34, 36
(1928). Kellog also noted that the Covenant of the League of Nations did not contain a
positive obligation to go to war, even against aggressors, although such an obligation did
exist in the treaties of Locarno, id. at 37. Kellog also contended that any state violating the
Pact of Paris "would automatically release the other parties from their obligations to the
treaty-breaking state. Any express recognition of this principle of law is wholly unneces-
sary." Id. at 38.
32. The decision to pursue collective security outside of the U.N. was due to not only
the superpower rivalry, but the perceived failures of the U.N. to preserve the peace in areas
where superpower interest was not yet considered to be unreconcilable, such as Palestine,
STROMBERG, supra note 15, at 191-92.
33. See North Atlantic Treaty, April 4, 1949, arts. 5-6, 63 Stat. 2241, reprinted in 4
FOREIGN REL. OF THE U.S. 281-85 (1949). An attack against one member of the alliance is
considered an attack against all.
34. Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, May 14, 1955, 219
U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in 49 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 194 (1955).
35. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT, supra note 6, at art. 16, 1.
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ately" impose sanctions on the aggressor state, but members were only to
take military action under the direction of the Council, "to protect the
covenants of the League." 6
The fourth system is illustrated both by the League of Nations
scheme and the U.N. framework.3 7 Here a supranational body is charged
with maintaining international peace and security and is empowered to
take various steps against aggression. 8 Aggression in both instances is de-
fined as an international crime and treated as a wrong against the inter-
national community.
39
From the examples given above, it is obvious that these systems co-
exist. But the coexistence is tenuous; there are ideological underpinnings
of the two systems that are inconsistent and will ultimately make one
system prevail over the other."0 This is because the animating legal prin-
ciples are different. The principle underlying system three is that the use
of force is wrong because it threatens the existence or welfare of a state;
the state is viewed as the basic unit of the international system. The goal
of this system is, therefore, the preservation of states.
The fourth system, however, is focused upon the principle that the
use of force is wrong because it represents a disruption of the global or-
der. Generally, the global order will require the preservation of states, but
in some instances, the global order may require the dismantling of states
if so required by the authoritative decision-maker. Further, any use of
force represents at least a theoretical diminution of the power of the in-
stitutional actor which is supposed to hold a monopoly on the use of force
or at least have the sole power to authorize its use.
It is possible to argue that the more institutionalized system should
be preferred for several reasons. First, it appeals to the notion that fair-
ness should triumph over mere brute strength, since a properly consti-
tuted institution can be viewed as employing its power after fair consider-
ation of competing claims, and thereby acting justly. Secondly, the
institutionalization of legitimate recourse to the use of force would have
the effect of lesser recourse to force. If the institution is properly consti-
tuted, its threat of force would be so overwhelming that criminal conduct
would be deterred and individual state use of legitimate force would be
36. Id. at art. 16, 1 1-2.
37. Arend claims that the U.N. system only promised a very limited type of collective
security due to the probability of the veto: there could be no collective security through
U.N. machinery against any of the permanent members of the Security Council. Arend,
supra note 1, at 9 n.40.
38. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT, supra note 6, at art. 10; U.N. CHARTER arts. 41-42.
39. See Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, Oct. 2, 1924, art.
2, L.N.O.J., Spec. Supp., No. 23, p. 498, reprinted in RIFAAT, supra note 5, at 54-55.
40. The U.S. claimed that NATO would only be a countermeasure to immediate aggres-
sion until the Security Council was able to act, STROMBERG, supra note 15, at 194; North
Atlantic Treaty, supra note 33, arts. 5-7. The contention that the U.N. is the primary
framework is weak since it was apparent to all at the time that either the U.S. or U.S.S.R.
would utilize a veto to prevent effective Security Council action in most cases.
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unnecessary since such claims would be vindicated by institutional threat
of force.
The remainder of this article documents the trends toward the likely
forms of institutionalization, while examining the changes the post-cold
war system is likely to make in the system of self-defense prevalent in the
international community.
III. ANALYSIS OF U.N. ACTION IN KUWAIT CRISIS
When Iraq invaded Kuwait, Kuwait clearly had a right to defend it-
self. Kuwait was an independent state, and a member of the United Na-
tions, and therefore had rights under article 51 of the Charter. The right
to self-defense was acknowledged in a Security Council resolution during
the crisis.41 Therefore, Kuwaiti defensive efforts, including the efforts of
the Kuwaiti resistance after Iraq's attempted annexation, (which the U.N.
declared illegal), had a firm basis in international law.
There are, however, some specific provisions of article 51 that merit
brief but careful examination. Article 51 requires that a state report ac-
tions taken in self-defense to the Security Council. 2 This has been inter-
preted by the International Court of Justice as a requirement of a state
declaring itself the victim of an armed attack, rather than a requirement
of detailing specific defensive measures taken." Kuwait clearly did this.
Another provision of Article 51 indicates that states are free to act in
self-defense "until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security."4" The precise meaning of this
phrase is difficult to determine. Does it mean that states must stop acting
even if Security Council actions are ineffective? That states must not act
unless the Security Council approves of its actions? That states merely
cannot take steps that would be inconsistent with Security Council ac-
tions? In the case of Kuwait, this raises an ambiguity. Was the action
taken by the Security Council merely an approval of Kuwait's measures
of collective self-defense or was it a U.N. action? Which principle was
being vindicated by the U.N. action: preservation of states or mainte-
nance of global order? Analysis of both the language of the U.N. resolu-
tions and the actions taken by the Kuwaiti alliance is necessary for a
proper examination of these questions.
The language of the Security Council resolutions is ambiguous. The
Council recognized Kuwait's right to respond with individual or collective
self-defense in an August resolution. The resolution, which imposed sanc-
41. S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 2933rd meeting (6 Aug. 1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M.
1325 (1990).
42. See D.W. Grieg, Self-Defence and the Security Council: What Does Article 51 Re-
quire?, 40 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 366, 367-69 (1991).
43. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 1.
44. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
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tions on Iraq, read in part: "Affirming the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence, in response to the armed attack by Iraq against
Kuwait, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter. . . "' In the same
resolution, "acting under Chapter VII of the Charter," the Council calls
upon all states to impose sanctions on Iraq for a dual purpose: to secure
compliance with an earlier Security Council resolution46 and "to restore
the authority of the legitimate government of Kuwait.
4 7
In a later resolution, the Security Council called upon
1) ... those member states co-operating with the Government of Ku-
wait which are deploying maritime forces in the area to use such mea-
sures commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be necessary
under the authority of the Security Council ... to ensure strict imple-
mentation of the provisions related to ... shipping laid down in reso-
lution 661 (1990)....
3. Requests all states to provide in accordance with the Charter such
assistance as may be required by the States referred to in paragraph 1
of this resolution.4
8
The resolution also requested the states so acting to coordinate their ef-
forts through the Military Staff Committee.49
Both of these resolutions indicate some uncertainty regarding the ba-
sis for action. In the former resolution, sanctions were imposed to both
secure compliance with Security Council decisions and to assist in the
defense of Kuwait's sovereignty. The difference between the two purposes
may be considered by some to be excessively legalistic since the decision
to be complied with was one that was designed to restore the sovereignty
of Kuwait.60
Some of the implications, however, are clearer in the latter resolu-
tion. There, the states that are acting independently under the right to
self-defense are authorized to act under the authority of the Security
Council to enforce the sanctions."' Further, paragraph 3 of that resolution
is painfully unclear. It does not specify for what purpose such assistance
should be given: should it be given merely to assist those states in enforc-
ing sanctions, or should it be given to assist those states acting under
Article 51 rights of collective self-defense? At the time, the type of assis-
tance was of crucial importance since the Security Council had not yet
explicitly authorized any use of force under U.N. auspices to liberate Ku-
45. S.C. Res. 661, supra note 41.
46. S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 2932nd mtg. (2 August 1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M.
1325 (1990) (calling for immediate Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait).
47. S.C. Res. 661, supra note 41, at 1 2.
48. S.C. Res. 665, U.N. SCOR, 2938th mtg. (25 August 1990), 77 1-2, reprinted in 29
I.L.M. 1329-30 (1990) (emphasis added).
49. Id. at $ 4.
50. See S.C. Res. 660, supra note 46; see also S/Res/661 supra note 41, at V 2.
51. Some states, such as Britain, interpreted this resolution as providing for the use of
force. See Current Development: The Invasion of Kuwait By Iraq, 40 INT'L & CoMP. L. Q.
482, 485 (1991).
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wait directly, although it had recognized the right of Kuwait to act under
Article 51.
The resolution that seemingly authorized the use of force was resolu-
tion 678, which permitted "Member States co-operating with the Govern-
ment of Kuwait" to implement the previous resolutions by using "all nec-
essary means" if Iraq failed to fully comply before January 15, 1991.52
Further, it authorized the same states "to restore international peace and
security in the area." 53 Such a broad delegation of power seems an at-
tempt to make the alliance an organ of the United Nations. Certainly,
restoration of international peace and security, if interpreted more
broadly than expelling Iraq from Kuwait, is beyond the scope of the
traditional right to self-defense. Too broad an interpretation would have
likely endangered the alliance as well as elicited strong dissent and a pos-
sible veto in the Security Council.
Several of the governments involved in Operation Desert Storm
viewed their actions as totally justified by the principle of collective self-
defense even without Security Council authorization. Several British offi-
cials, before the November resolution, claimed that "authorization from
the Security Council was not a legal necessity for the use of force" 4 or
that the choice should not be put "wholly and entirely with the machin-
ery of the U.N.."55 However, they did recognize the political expediency
of gaining U.N. authorization.
The U.S. position was complex, if not confused. Near the end of the
Desert Storm offensive, President Bush stated the goals of the alliance:
"Our goal remains what it's been all along - Iraq's complete and uncon-
ditional compliance with all relevant United Nations resolutions and its
implementation of all the requirements to be found in Security Council
Resolution 686 . . .6
Earlier, on January 5, 1991, he had emphasized the U.N. role in cit-
ing "the condemnation of the world in the form of no less than 12 resolu-
tions of the U.N. Security Council," '5 7 but later in the same address noted
other more fundamental considerations: "We have seen too often in this
century how quickly any threat to one becomes a threat to all. At this
critical moment in history, at a time the Cold War is fading into the past,
we cannot fail. At stake is the kind of world we will inhabit."' s
52. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 2963rd mtg. (29 Nov. 1990), % 2, reprinted in 29 I.L.M.
1565 (1990).
53. Id.
54. Prime Minister (Mrs. Thatcher), H.C. Hansard, Vol. 177, col. 738 (6 Sept. 1990),
cited in Current Developments, supra. note 51, at 487.
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There are several ways of interpreting this passage. Its failure to be
grounded in legal considerations, and the rather grand historical analogy,
may indicate that what is at stake is U.S. leadership in the post-Cold War
era. A second interpretation, which would be more comfortable to the
other members of the alliance, would be that the grander principle at
stake is the principle of non-aggression and global security. Indeed this is
the principle Bush emphasized to the allies a few days later: "[Iraq's]
unprovoked invasion was more than an attack on Kuwait, more than the
brutal occupation of a tiny nation that posed no threat to its large and
powerful neighbor. It was an assault on the very notion of international
order."5 9
In any case, it is clear that the U.S. viewed the issues at stake as
more than a mere alliance commitment to Kuwait. The issue for analysis
here remains as what did the actors perceive as the issue at stake and
what was the perceived role of the institutional actor, the U.N.?
The U.S. view of the U.N. role may have unwittingly been stated
clearly by presidential spokesman Marlin Fitzwater in the following
statement:
The President spoke with U.N. Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar
late this afternoon to discuss the Secretary-General's upcoming visit
to Baghdad. The President wished him well and stated that he was
pleased that the Secretary-General is undertaking this mission for
peace. The President noted that the United Nations has played a key
role in building and maintaining the international coalition against
the Iraqi aggression.6
This instrumental view of the U.N. should be contrasted with the
views of other allies. For example, the Prime Minister of Canada was
quick to emphasize his country's role as a supporter of the U.N. rather
than as an ally of the U.S.: ". . . all possible diplomatic means that might
resolve the situation must be examined, and no promising avenue should
be overlooked .... [Ihf Saddam Hussein continues to reject the path of
peace, Canada will stand with the United Nations in implementing its
resolutions as Canada has always done."6 1 The reference to alliance with
the United Nations rather than the U.S. is significant since the statement
was made at a joint press conference with U.S. Secretary of State James
Baker.
The position of other governments should also be briefly considered.
Japan, for example, while not taking an active military role in the Gulf,
had an interest in shaping the new world order. In February 1991,
monthly publication of Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party summa-
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rized the government's position, noting, "[Japanese government] officials
emphasized that: 1) Japan has a duty to assist the multinational forces,
although it must make its own decisions on specific support measures,
and 2) when Americans are shedding blood, Japan cannot remain
unconcerned." 2
While Japan's earlier statements emphasized the U.N. role,"3 the lan-
guage of the February statement seems clearly in the nature of collective
self-defense concerns. This is particularly true of the second point, which
indicates a concern for the preservation of an alliance.
An Indian statement at approximately the same time places much
more emphasis on the U.N. In a February 9, 1991, statement, a Foreign
Office spokesman urged a Security Council meeting to "ensure that the
conduct of military operations is in strict conformity with U.N. Resolu-
tion 678."" The statement emphasized that the objective of the resolu-
tion was to "liberate Kuwait and not to subdue Iraq or dismantle its tech-
nological and physical infrastructure or to cripple its social and economic
life .... -65 While all these statements have different emphases, one must
ask if the differences are significant. If some of the alliance states claimed
to be acting in collective self-defense (although appreciating the U.N. au-
thorization) while others claimed that alliance forces were strictly bound
by the U.N. resolutions, was there any difference in the standards im-
posed in either case?
If it is recalled that a right to act in self-defense of others, and even
in self-defense of oneself, is only a justification for a limited use of force,
one can contend that the standards are equivalent. Self-defense under
international law requires consideration of both necessity and proportion-
ality. These are the very concerns the Indian spokesman raises in the con-
text of the harm caused to Iraqi civilians.66 These concerns would have
been relevant if the Security Council had not considered the issue at all
and the alliance states were acting purely under Article 51 rights as de-
fined in customary international law.6" Indeed, most of the debate can be
viewed as differences in perceptions of the necessity and proportionality
of the force employed. For example, many anti-war protesters in the U.S.
and elsewhere contended that the inadequacy of sanctions had not been
demonstrated." If this contention is correct, it would mean that the use
of force was not necessary.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
From the presentation above, several points become clear. First, in
acting in the Kuwait crisis, the Security Council not only authorized the
Desert Storm action by the Kuwait alliance, but in doing so fused (or
confused) the powers given to states under Article 51 with the power of
the Security Council "to maintain international peace and security." This
fusion was most evident in Resolution 678 which set the January 15 dead-
line for Iraq to comply with the earlier resolutions. 9 This fusion has sev-
eral implications. Initially, it indicates that the Security Council is likely
to play a more active role in defining what is proper self-defense, and
therefore, in theory at least, indicates that the Security Council will be
more likely to limit recourse to the doctrine in the future. Another impli-
cation is that the fusion of these powers will give states acting in self-
defense under U.N. authorization additional powers beyond that which
they could have claimed under customary international law. While it is
unlikely that the Security Council could authorize the use of force much
beyond the traditional limits of self-defense and still carry the coalition of
permanent members needed, it has clearly gone beyond the core rights of
self-defense in authorizing the control and supervision over Iraq's chemi-
cal and nuclear war capability.
Second, the states participating in Desert Storm, and the global com-
munity in general, may have had differing perceptions of what was at
stake in Kuwait, and in particular, the role of the United Nations in the
conflict. While it is difficult to predict how future leaders will assess the
operation, it is certainly clear that there was more than enough rhetoric
by all participants and observers regarding the vindication of interna-
tional legal principles against aggression and the enforcement of U.N. res-
olutions to suggest that the action in Kuwait may be given that signifi-
cance in the future. Given the basic agreement on the vindication of some
(but not necessarily the same) legal principle by the Kuwait alliance, it is
unlikely that the events will be remembered as American or Western
imperialism.
Third, the actions of the U.N. and the Kuwait allies does signal an
improvement in the system of international security. Where before, in the
Cold War system, a very limited type 3 system of collective security ex-
isted in Europe through NATO and WTO, the Kuwait crisis signals the
globalization of this system. While the United Nations has not developed
the kind of independent military capability that would enable it to imple-
ment a type 4 system, it appears that through the sanctioning of Article
51 actions by states, and by playing a significant role in mobilizing collec-
tive security responses, the system of international security has evolved
for the better. While this evolution is incomplete and tentative at this
time, and there will certainly be setbacks in the future when permanent
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members disagree, the new system promises to limit the recourse to force
by aggressors, thereby accomplishing one of the major purposes of the
United Nations.
